A familiar and unsettling feeling swept through the Dallas sports landscape recently. For the second time in under a year, a Dallas team offloaded a superstar in his mid-20s for what many perceived as a modest return, just as a massive contract extension loomed. First, it was Luka Dončić, arguably the NBA`s premier offensive talent. Then, Micah Parsons, possibly the NFL`s best defensive player. Both were traded, arguably before reaching their prime, within a mere seven months. The same city, it seems, has voluntarily parted ways with two generational talents.
While the long-term implications for Dončić and Parsons in their new homes remain to be seen, early indicators are positive. Both have since secured lucrative contract extensions. The Green Bay Packers, Parsons` new team, are now tied for the fifth-best Super Bowl odds at +1200, according to FanDuel Sportsbook. Vegas is less bullish on the 2025-26 Los Angeles Lakers, Dončić`s new squad, viewing the current season as transitional. The strategy in Tinseltown is clear: leverage Dončić to attract another young superstar, eventually replacing LeBron James and ushering in the Lakers` next golden era. Remarkably, two of the most successful franchises in NBA and NFL history have simultaneously recharged their rosters at Dallas’s expense.
However, success for the Lakers and Packers is, historically speaking, almost a given. The real question is how Dallas will rebound from these seismic departures. Both the Cowboys and Mavericks found themselves in precarious positions post-trade. With two potential local legends prematurely shipped out, it’s time to assess which Dallas team will ultimately regret its blockbuster deal more.
The Case Against the Dončić Trade
Let’s begin with an undeniable truth: an NBA star wields significantly more influence over a game than an NFL star. At best, an NFL player (outside of a rare few like Travis Hunter Jr.) is on the field for less than half the game. Dončić, throughout his career, has averaged nearly 35 minutes per game, meaning he`s active for about 73% of a 48-minute contest. He plays with just four teammates, allowing him to control the ball on virtually every offensive possession for the Mavericks. Parsons, a pass-rusher, simply cannot exert the same degree of influence over a football game that Dončić can over a basketball game.
Team performance also plays a role. Parsons won only a single playoff game with the Cowboys, and the team missed the 2025 playoffs entirely. While not his fault, it’s hard to argue the Cowboys were closing an immediate championship window by trading him. In stark contrast, the Mavericks were the reigning Western Conference champions when they dealt Dončić. Despite battling injuries early in the 2024-25 season, they had famously eliminated the eventual 2025 champion Oklahoma City Thunder in the 2024 postseason. The Thunder, widely considered future championship favorites, were uniquely vexed by Dončić. Over the past two seasons, the Thunder hold a 5-6 record against Dončić-led teams but a dominant 143-45 against everyone else. Now, the Mavericks must contend with their kryptonite without their only weapon.
This leads to the next layer of devastation for Dallas. The Mavericks didn’t trade Dončić for a future-oriented package of assets. Instead, it was a “win-now” move that arguably weakened them in both the present and future. Yes, Anthony Davis remains an effective player, but he turned 32 a month after the trade and has a notorious injury history. Since the Orlando bubble, he has missed 141 out of 400 regular-season games. Kenny Clark, the defensive lineman the Cowboys received for Parsons, is 29 and has not missed a game in three years.
Mavericks GM Nico Harrison’s “win-now” vision, centered on a partnership between Davis and Kyrie Irving, was quickly derailed by Irving`s torn ACL. Irving may or may not play in the 2025-26 season, and either way, he turns 34 this year, having just received a three-year contract. The Mavericks are now saddled with significant risky money. The Cowboys, on the other hand, mitigated the financial risk of a long-term Parsons extension.
Beyond finances, there’s the inherent risk of trading stars in different leagues. While Parsons appears to be a safe bet, the NFL is not the NBA. Star trades in the NBA almost invariably benefit the acquiring team. Consider the last seven NBA champions: over half – the 2019 Raptors (Kawhi Leonard), 2020 Lakers (Anthony Davis), 2021 Bucks (Jrue Holiday), and 2024 Celtics (also Jrue Holiday) – won immediately following a star trade. This reflects supply and demand; multiple superstars are a prerequisite for NBA championships, and given the limited supply of elite talent, demand is sky-high, making almost any price justifiable. While exceptions exist (like the Thunder benefiting from the Clippers overpaying for Paul George), the Mavericks didn’t receive a haul like Shai Gilgeous-Alexander and five first-round picks. They were simply on the losing end of a trade that rarely provides the outlier package needed to justify such a move.
Conversely, building a Super Bowl champion in the NFL is far more complex. While top talent is essential, rosters are deeper, and individual players have less overall importance, allowing teams more flexibility in construction. Every NBA champion boasts a star-level primary ball-handler like Dončić. Not every Super Bowl champion features a star-level pass-rusher like Parsons.
In fact, recent history of major NFL trades suggests that the teams giving up stars often fare better. In the last decade, seven players have been traded for at least two first-round picks. The Deshaun Watson and Russell Wilson trades proved disastrous for the acquiring teams. Jamal Adams made only one Pro Bowl as a Seahawk and was released after four years and just 34 games. Khalil Mack and Laremy Tunsil played well enough to justify their price, but their teams never reached a conference championship with them.
Of these seven, only the two trades made by the Rams for Matthew Stafford and Jalen Ramsey could be classified as absolute successes, leading to a Super Bowl win. However, look at the returns for Detroit and Jacksonville. The Lions parlayed Stafford`s picks into players like Jahmyr Gibbs, Sam LaPorta, and Jameson Williams, also acquiring Jared Goff in the deal. The Jaguars fared worse, taking K’Lavon Chaisson and Travis Etienne with their picks. Yet, this reflects poor drafting rather than inadequate return value; in 2020, Justin Jefferson, Brandon Aiyuk, Jordan Love, and Patrick Queen were all drafted within 10 picks of Chaisson. The NFL`s inherent randomness, with injuries and unpredictable aging curves, often makes star trades an escape route for teams with expensive players. The team trading away the star often “wins” these deals, far more frequently than in the NBA.
The Cowboys know this firsthand. Their 1990s dynasty was built on a trade similar to the one that brought Gilgeous-Alexander to Oklahoma City: the Herschel Walker trade, which yielded an historic haul of picks. The Vikings, in contrast, got three fairly average years of production from Walker. While the Cowboys didn`t replicate the Walker deal`s return for Parsons, trading away Walker-esque players in the NFL is generally a better strategy than parting with Dončić-esque players in the NBA. Parsons clearly falls into the former category.
This dynamic is inherent to football. It`s a physically demanding game where players decline earlier and often abruptly. Parsons and Dončić may both be 26, but NBA stars frequently maintain peak performance well into their 30s – a rarity for NFL non-quarterbacks. While Parsons might be better at his job than Dončić is at his, it’s hard to imagine his career longevity matching Dončić’s. The Mavericks almost certainly sacrificed more potential Dončić greatness than the Cowboys did with Parsons.
The Case Against the Parsons Trade
Let`s start with an obvious distinction: the NFL doesn`t have a lottery. Both the Mavericks and Cowboys were left, seemingly, as below-average teams after their respective trades. The Mavericks finished the 2024 season with the 11th-worst record in the NBA. As for the Cowboys, FanDuel Sportsbook odds suggest they are slightly more likely to win fewer than 7.5 games in 2025 (-135) than to exceed that total (+115). Last season, the Cowboys won exactly seven games, earning the No. 12 pick. While a No. 12 pick can yield a superstar (Dallas famously got Parsons in that slot), it`s far from a certainty. No NFL Draft slot is a guarantee, and even top-tier quarterbacks bust as often as they succeed.
Conversely, top NBA picks are significantly safer, and thanks to the lottery, the Mavericks dramatically moved from No. 11 to No. 1, selecting Cooper Flagg. History suggests Flagg is almost guaranteed to be an All-Star; every No. 1 overall pick between 2008 and 2023, save for Anthony Bennett, Markelle Fultz, and Deandre Ayton, made at least one All-Star Team.
Flagg was not a direct acquisition in the Dončić trade, but Dončić`s departure was functionally responsible for Flagg landing in Dallas. Had Dončić stayed, the Mavericks would likely have made the playoffs, precluding their lottery jump. While Davis, Max Christie, and a 2029 first-round pick from the Lakers is a poor return for Dončić alone, adding Flagg into the equation—making it Dončić and a mid-first-round pick for Davis, Christie, a 2029 first, and Flagg—makes the trade much closer to fair value. As established, a single player has a far greater impact in basketball than in football, meaning if Flagg lives up to expectations, he could eventually become a Dončić-level replacement.
The Cowboys, however, are unlikely to stumble into a Parsons replacement. If they win around seven games as Vegas predicts, they`re once again looking at a mid-first-round pick without the upside potential of the NBA Draft lottery. In truth, most NFL teams in this predicament would be better off winning two or three games. At least then, the Parsons trade could functionally lead to a draft pick capable of becoming a franchise quarterback on a rookie contract.
Except the Cowboys already have a highly paid quarterback in Dak Prescott, who commands roughly 18% of the salary cap this season. This figure is set to jump in 2026 and 2027, with their first potential “out” not until 2028, according to Spotrac. Moving off Prescott would be so financially prohibitive from a cap perspective that the benefits of drafting a new quarterback would be limited. Moreover, the most highly-regarded quarterback in this year`s class, Arch Manning, isn`t a lock to enter the draft anyway. If Manning remains in college, the trade value of a No. 1 overall pick for Dallas would also be diminished. No matter how you slice it, the Cowboys are almost certainly poised to benefit less from Parsons` absence in upcoming drafts than the Mavericks did from Dončić`s. There’s no obvious replacement on the horizon for the Cowboys.
This lack of a clear path forward makes the Parsons trade such a head-scratcher. The Mavericks at least acquired a premium asset in Davis. Their “defense wins championships” strategy, while ultimately flawed, was still a discernible plan. Davis, despite his durability issues, remains a superstar when healthy.
Kenny Clark, the defensive tackle acquired by the Cowboys, likely isn`t in that superstar category. He missed the Pro Bowl last year after three appearances in the preceding five seasons. His five QB hits in 17 games were his fewest since his rookie year, and his four tackles for loss and one sack were his lowest marks since 2020 (a season in which he played only 13 games). While it`s possible he simply had a down year, nose tackles are not known for aging gracefully. This decade, only four defensive tackles have earned Pro Bowl nods in their 30s: Aaron Donald (a future Hall of Famer), Chris Jones, Fletcher Cox, and Cam Heyward (all with strong Hall of Fame cases). Clark is less accomplished than any of them. He may offer some help to a struggling Dallas rushing defense, but he won`t single-handedly fix it, nor will he come close to matching Parsons` value as a pass-rusher.
Two first-round picks sound appealing on paper, but typically, teams trading away two first-round picks for a veteran do so because they don`t expect those picks to be very high. Exceptions exist, of course (the Seahawks, for instance, both gave away a top-10 pick in the Adams trade and received one in the Wilson trade, highlighting how teams can misjudge their own potential). But generally, these are contenders trading away picks that will be relatively low.
The Packers haven`t picked in the top 10 since 2009. This is not a franchise whose draft picks inspire confidence for high-value returns. Only the Eagles have shorter odds to win the NFC this season, and crucially, the Packers remain the NFL’s youngest team, with an upward trajectory. While the chaotic nature of the NFL, with injuries or luck, could hold them back, these picks are most likely to fall in the 20s. Great players can certainly be found in that range, but it`s significantly harder to find elite talent at premium positions like pass-rusher. Players with Parsons` physical tools rarely slip past the top half of the first round.
Again, one can debate the wisdom of trading for a player like Davis under the Mavericks` specific circumstances, but he is still a superstar, at least for now. Even if they decide to rebuild around Flagg (which they absolutely should), they could still trade Davis for a significant haul. What would the Cowboys get for Kenny Clark? Perhaps a mid-round pick? While Jerry Jones has hinted at flipping this draft capital for “win-now” talent, players like Parsons rarely become available, and when they do, they command far more than the Cowboys received. Those late first-round picks will only go so far on the trade market, and whatever they bring back, it won`t be Parsons.
Frankly, one could argue that Dončić isn`t even Parsons. The Mavericks traded Dončić because they believed he had a critical flaw: his defense, stemming from what they perceived as poor conditioning. While that logic is debatable, it was at least a basketball reason, even if it was a bad basketball reason. Even if Parsons spends less time on the field than Dončić due to playing a different sport, he is far closer to a flawless player at his position than Dončić is at his. The Cowboys didn`t trade Parsons because they believed he was overrated. They traded him due to a contract dispute that spiraled out of control.
And that brings us to the final, crucial point: the decision-makers. Nico Harrison, the Mavericks` General Manager, is widely criticized, but he is a GM. Mavericks ownership can replace him at any time. Eventually, Patrick Dumont will likely recognize the need for change, though Harrison’s plan may need to fail first. The person who executed the trade is not truly in charge and can be held accountable.
Jerry Jones, however, cannot be replaced. He owns the team and will presumably run it for the rest of his life. The Cowboys have not reached the NFC Championship Game since the 1995 season, meaning three decades have passed since their last final four appearance, with Jones at the helm throughout. Sadly, questionable moves like the Parsons trade are simply the norm for the Cowboys. Ultimately, no one will be held accountable if this trade proves to be a failure.
The Verdict
I began this analysis convinced the Dončić trade was unequivocally worse. In fairness, I cover the NBA full-time and haven`t written extensively about the NFL in years. The deeper I delved into the Parsons trade, the more my conviction wavered. Ultimately, however, I couldn`t be fully swayed. I still believe the Dončić trade to be the greater debacle, though by a narrower margin than I initially anticipated.
Here`s why: the Cowboys are operating with an asset surplus in a league with extreme parity, while the Mavericks are operating with an asset deficit in a league with fairly limited parity.
What does this mean? Even if the Cowboys took a significant step backward with the Parsons trade, the NFL is a league where well-managed teams can rebound swiftly. It consistently sees several new playoff teams each year, and thanks to the single-elimination format, merely making the tournament offers a plausible chance at winning it all. Despite the Parsons trade, the Cowboys still possess the foundational tools for a turnaround. They have a viable quarterback, another non-quarterback superstar in CeeDee Lamb, extra draft picks, and the money they would have spent on Parsons` re-signing. While trying to replace arguably the best defensive player in football is not a wise strategy, it`s reasonably plausible given the nature of the sport. An NFL team has 22 starters; there are many pathways to success, and the Cowboys have the means to explore them.
The path to success in the NBA is far narrower, demanding greater discipline and harshly punishing erratic decision-making. The Mavericks spent years meticulously building a team around Dončić`s unique strengths, a strategy that led them to the 2024 NBA Finals. But upon trading him, they didn`t magically recover all the assets they invested in building that team. They control none of their first-round picks between 2027 and 2030, which will make rebuilding around the younger Flagg`s timeline substantially more difficult. They also haven`t flipped their excess of centers and forwards for the guards needed to run a functional offense when Irving eventually returns, and they show no inclination to do so. The NBA is not the NFL. With only five starters, balance is delicate and essential. The Mavericks lack it and seem uninterested in finding it. Furthermore, the NBA is far less prone to upsets than the NFL; merely making the playoffs means little when you must beat the best teams four times out of seven. The cream, by and large, rises to the top.
The Cowboys were a middle-of-the-pack team with Parsons. They are now a worse middle-of-the-pack team without him. They still boast one of the NFL`s better offenses. If they draft wisely and make a savvy trade or two, they could conceivably bring their defense back up to speed within the next year or two before the offense declines. Is this likely? Probably not. But the NFL is generally more forgiving of individual mistakes.
The Mavericks were an undeniable contender with Dončić. They are emphatically not a contender without him. And these weren`t short-term labels; having Dončić could have led to a decade of contention had the roster around him been managed correctly. Football players tend to have shorter shelf lives, and Parsons will almost certainly age out of stardom before Dončić does. The Mavericks` future without Dončić simply looks far bleaker.
They will play most of this season without Irving due to injury. He will return late in the season or the following year, by which point both he and Davis will likely have declined due to age and health. At that point, they won`t be championship contenders, and moving those players for significant value, given their high cap figures, ages, and the NBA`s luxury tax aprons, will be exceedingly difficult. This predicament will leave them without the means to rebuild around Flagg, as they spent all their draft capital building a team around a player they no longer possess. While you can replace a pass-rusher with an inferior player at his position and upgrade elsewhere, you cannot replace an NBA ball-handler in the same manner. Dončić virtually embodies a top-five offense; having him guarantees a degree of offensive success that no football player, not even a quarterback, can replicate.
This fundamental reality is what ultimately pushed the Dončić trade over the top. It was not only the worst trade in recent NBA history but also the worst one the city of Dallas experienced in 2025, even if it faced stiffer competition for that distinction than anyone expected last February.
